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I. INTRODUCTION
What’s that smell?
Gina Glazer says that the smelly mold started growing in her
Whirlpool front-loading washing machine about six months after
she bought it. Glazer scrubbed. She left the machine’s door open
when she wasn’t using it. The mold wouldn’t go away and neither
would the smell. Glazer called Whirlpool to complain. 1
Glazer then became one of many who joined a class action
lawsuit against Whirlpool. 2 The class was subsequently certified 3
despite the fact that “97 percent of the class members had never
complained about any problem with their washers.” 4 These suits
are commonly referred to as “overbroad” and “no injury” class
action lawsuits. 5 The Supreme Court has been taking steps to
eliminate these overbroad class actions, 6 yet a misapplication of
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School, January 2015. The author of this
comment would like to thank the members of THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW
REVIEW, especially Paul Mosser for his help as the lead editor of this
comment. The author would also like to thank her friends and family for their
continuing love and support. This comment is dedicated to Danny Walsh,
without whose loving affection this comment would have been finished in half
the time.
1. Emily Bazelon, The Case of the Moldy Washing Machines: The Laundry
Litigation that Could Determine the Future of Class-Action Lawsuits, Slate
(July 26, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2013/07/whirpool_s_moldy_washing_machines_america_s_most_important_cl
ass_action.html.
2. See Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig., No.
1:08-WP-65000, 2010 WL 2756947, at *1 (N.D. Ohio July 12, 2010), aff’d, 678
F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 133 S. Ct.
1722 (2013), aff’d, 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277
(2014) (stating that “[p]laintiffs Gina Glazer and Trina Allison move to certify
. . . this multidistrict products liability litigation based on Defendant
Whirlpool’s allegedly defective front-loading washing machines”).
3. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liab. Litig.,
722 F.3d 838, 846 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014)
(certifying a class of plaintiffs).
4. John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, Supreme Court
Vacates No-Injury Consumer Class Action, SKADDEN (April 1, 2013), http://
www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Supreme_Court_Vacates_No
-Injury_Consumer_Class_Action.pdf.
5. “No Injury” and “Overbroad” Class Actions After Comcast, Glazer and
Butler: Implications for Certification, STRAFFORD, http://www.straffordpub.
com/products/no-injury-and-overbroad-class-actions-after-comcast-glazer-andbutler-implications-for-certification-2014-04-01 (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
6. See D. Matthew Allen & Amanda Arnold Sansone, Certification: The
‘Rigorous Analysis’ Overlay on Current Class Action Jurisprudence,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.bna.com/the-rigorous-analysisoverlay-on-current-class-action-jurisprudence (discussing how recent Supreme
Court decisions show a “natural progression of the slow evolution of the class
action device”); see also Robert H. Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class
Actions, 44 LOY. U. CHI . L. J. 533, 533 (2012) (asserting that in “recent years
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precedent by the circuit courts has been rendered the Supreme
Court’s efforts futile. 7 The question remains, has the Supreme
Court limited class actions lawsuits? Or are the lower courts
correct in finding that the Supreme Court’s rulings are fact specific
and do not indicate an intent to drastically limit the breadth of
class action suits?
This Comment addresses recent developments in the law of
class action waivers and certification. Specifically, it looks at three
cases—Comcast, 8 Concepcion, 9 and Wal-Mart 10—in which the
Supreme Court limited class action litigation and class
arbitration. 11 This Comment also addresses how the circuit courts
are hesitant to follow the Supreme Court’s precedent. 12
Section II of this Comment looks at the background of class
action waivers and class certification. Section III argues that the
circuit courts are attempting to preserve class action litigation in
spite of the Supreme Court’s recent limiting decisions. Section IV
addresses how class action litigation is unfavorable from a public
policy standpoint and proposes that the Supreme Court should
pass down another decision, further limiting the application of
class action lawsuits.

courts have cut back sharply on the ability to bring class action lawsuits”);
Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV . 729, 731
(2013) (stating that “[n]umerous courts have become skeptical about certifying
class actions”).
7. See Jessica Dye, 7th Circuit stands by washing-machine classes despite
Comcast, REUTERS LEGAL (Aug. 26th, 2013), https://a.next.westlaw.com/Docu
ment/I79492b900e3911e3a438c00abe04d1f6/View/FullText.html?transitionTy
pe=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default) (addressing how the circuit
courts have restored classes for class action lawsuits even after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Comcast, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s order that
“vacated and remanded the case with instruction to reconsider in light of
Comcast”).
8. Comcast v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
9. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes et al., 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
10. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
11. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (declining to certify a class and
finding that Rule 23(b)(3) was not satisfied because individual questions of
damages would predominate over questions common to the class); AT&T
Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53 (finding that a California state law that
classifies most class action waivers as unconscionable was preempted by the
FAA); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (finding that a common question for all
plaintiffs will not suffice to meet the commonality standard because there
must be a common answer for all of the plaintiffs).
12. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (certifying a class after receiving an order from
the Supreme Court to rule in light of Comcast); Whirlpool, 722 F.3d at 846
(restoring a class of plaintiffs after the Supreme Court ordered the Court to
rule in light of Comcast); Leyva v. Medline Indus., 716 F.3d 510, 511 (9th Cir.
2013) (applying Comcast and still finding that the class should be certified).
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II. CLASS ACTIONS: THE FAA, CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS, AND RECENT TRENDS IN SUPREME
COURT CASE LAW
Class actions are a way for a few plaintiffs to join together
and litigate a claim on behalf of both themselves—that is, the
named plaintiffs—and class members who do not join as
plaintiffs. 13 Class actions provide an avenue for plaintiffs to
litigate a claim that would otherwise be economically infeasible to
pursue by allowing litigation costs to be shared by and claim
values to be aggregated for class members. 14 This background
section addresses how the Supreme Court is limiting class action
litigation by strengthening the requirements for certification and
enforcing class action waivers and arbitration agreements.

A. Arbitration and Class Action Waivers
Limit Class Actions
Arbitration agreements and class action waivers limit class
action litigation. 15 Arbitration agreements are contracts where the
parties agree to “submit any disagreements to an arbitrator rather
than pursue relief through the judicial system.” 16 Similarly, a class
action waiver is a contract in which the parties agree to “only
bring individual claims and . . . not assert claims on behalf of a
class of similarly situated plaintiffs, either in an arbitration
proceeding or in court.” 17 Thus, these agreements can serve a dual
purpose: they can require the parties to arbitrate their claims and
to waive their right to bring a class action lawsuit. 18 These two
provisions are commonly joined in an arbitration clause that
includes a class action waiver. 19
13. 12 ROBERT M. LANGER, ET AL, CONN. PRAC. SERIES, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES § 8.4 (2013) (stating that “the class action is a procedural
mechanism enabling representative parties to litigate on behalf of a class of
unnamed persons who are not joined in the action”).
14. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 4:87
(5th ed. 2013) (stating that the purpose of a class action is “to enable the
litigation of claims that would otherwise be infeasible to litigate because the
value of the claim is dwarfed by the costs of adjudicating it”).
15. See generally Gesina M. Seiler, Arbitration Provisions Limiting Class
Actions—The Continuing Saga, 20 No. 5 WIS . EMP. L. LETTER 4 (discussing
the Supreme Court case, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., which
addresses how arbitration agreements can limit class action lawsuits).
16. 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions, § 6:63 (5th ed.
2013).
17. Id.
18. See id. (discussing how arbitration clauses have “two procedural
provisions: an agreement to arbitrate and a class action waiver”).
19. See J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers
and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV . 1735, 1749 (2006)
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Despite the advantages of arbitration agreements, 20 federal
courts were initially unwilling to enforce them. 21 Courts displayed
hostility towards arbitration agreements by finding the
agreements revocable at the will of either party. 22 In effect, courts
have made arbitration clauses unenforceable. 23 In 1925, however,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act, or the “FAA,” 24
“which created a federal policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements.” 25 The FAA was designed to combat the
courts’ “hostility toward arbitration agreements.” 26
The FAA affirmatively states that arbitration agreements are
enforceable and irrevocable unless grounds exist in law or equity
to find them unenforceable. 27 While the Act certifies the
(discussing how companies have been advised to “include class action waivers
in arbitration agreements”).
20. See id. at 1738 (alleging that critics of the adversarial system agree
that arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, has many
advantages, such as being a “cost-effective, and specialized alternative to
formal, public litigation”). This article also notes that parties who arbitrate are
better able to utilize flexible procedures that result in swifter adjudication
than civil litigation. Id. at 1739. The arbitration process is also quicker
because the arbitrator typically does not publish the opinion; therefore, the
time between the hearing and the final result is shorter. Id.; see also Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM . & MARY L. REV . 1, 22 (2000) (stating that the
parties to a dispute are able to choose an arbitrator that may be a technical
expert in a certain field; therefore, the parties will be able to discuss complex
issues without having to take the time out to explain these issues to a judge
who may not be familiar with them).
21. Glover, supra note 19, at 1739 (discussing how the federal courts were
not eager to enforce arbitration agreements (citing Kulukundis Shipping Co.,
S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d. Cir. 1942); U.S. Asphalt Ref.
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (1915)).
22. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 981–84 (holding that a
mandatory arbitration agreement is revocable at the will of either party and
therefore unenforceable); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co., 222 F. at 1008 (finding that a
mandatory arbitration agreement is revocable).
23. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 981–84 (finding the
mandatory arbitration agreement revocable and unenforceable); U.S. Asphalt
Ref. Co., 222 F. at 1008 (holding that the mandatory arbitration agreement is
revocable, and therefore unenforceable).
24. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009).
25. Keith N. Hylton, Agreement to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV . 209, 215 (2000); see Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that
section 2 of the FAA is a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary”); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745
(2011) (stating that “[t]he FAA was enacted in 1925 in response to widespread
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”).
26. Hylton, supra note 25, at 215.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2009). Section 2 of the FAA states that “an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
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enforceability of arbitration agreements, litigants still attempt to
use state-law unconscionability doctrines to invalidate arbitration
and waiver agreements. 28 Such invalidation attempts still can be
advanced because, in 1996, the Supreme Court found that
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening § 2” of the FAA. 29
Unconscionability arguments typically run as follows: “the
inclusion of class action waivers in standard adhesion contracts
renders the agreements so one-sided as to satisfy the common law
contract doctrine prohibiting unconscionable agreements.” 30
Despite Congress’ clear intention to promote arbitration
agreements through the FAA, some courts have still found this
argument appealing and held arbitration agreements and class
action waivers unenforceable under the state law doctrine of
unconscionability. 31 But “the majority of courts analyzing class
action waivers have upheld their validity against claims that they
are unconscionable.” 32
contract.” Id.
28. See Frank A. Luchak, Consumer Contracts and Class Actions: U.S.
Supreme Court to Decide Whether State Unconscionability Law Bars
Mandatory Individual Arbitration of Claims, N.J. LAWYER MAG., 1, 9–10
(2011),
available
at
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/luchak_
njlawyer_0411.pdf (stating that many states have “refused to enforce class
action waivers because they are deemed unconscionable under state law”).
29. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
30. Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in
the Wake of AT&T Mobility V Concepcion, 79 U. CHI . L. REV . 623, 632 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that “the agreement's class action waiver [was] substantively
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under Oregon law”); see also
Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104–05 (W.D.
Mich. 2000) (finding a class action waiver unconscionable under Michigan
law); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1178 (W.D. Wash.
2002) (finding a class action waiver unconscionable, and therefore
unenforceable under Washington law); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d
570, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“[a]pplying general principles of contract
law,” and holding that the arbitration clause was “unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable”); Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del.,
912 A.2d 88, 100 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable as against public policy); State ex rel. v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d
265, 284–85 (W. Va. 2002) (finding that an agreement that prohibited class
action relief was unconscionable and void); see generally William M. Howard,
Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions 13 A.L.R. 6th 145
(2006) (citing and analyzing state and federal cases that have considered
whether a class action waiver renders an agreement unconscionable and
unenforceable); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 78 n.13 (2004) (citing
cases that found class action waivers to be unconscionable and unenforceable).
32. Glover, supra note 19, at 1751; see Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339
F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding an arbitration agreement that

2014]

Are Class Actions a Thing of the Past?

341

However, there is still reason for concern. States and federal
courts that have adopted the minority rule, specifically Illinois,
California, and the Ninth Circuit Court, have not waivered; they
continue to find class actions waivers as unenforceable and
unconscionable. 33 There is a concern that these minority courts
specifically precludes class actions enforceable); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank,
N.A., 27 F. App’x. 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that “an arbitration agreement
barring class wide relief for claims brought under the TILA is not
unconscionable”); see also Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, Inc., 290
F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that an arbitration agreement was not
unconscionable even though the individual plaintiff only had a small amount
of individual damages); Tsadilas v. Providian Nat’l Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478,
480–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (affirming lower court’s decision and holding
that a clause in the contract that waives the right to a class action is not
unconscionable).
33. Glover, supra note 19, at 1752; see Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d
1165, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a class action waiver unconscionable
and stating that under California law, “the coverage of the arbitration
agreement is substantively unconscionable” because the “prohibition of class
action proceedings in its arbitral forum is manifestly and shockingly onesided”); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding certain
provisions of an arbitration agreement unconscionable). The court here
specifically looked at a clause that prohibited class actions, noting that the
customers were never given an opportunity for “negotiation, modification, or
waiver” and the customers were given the contract “on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.” Id. at 1149. In determining that the clause was unconscionable the
Court stated that the decision was in line with the “FAA's particular rule . . .
[that] generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2.” Id. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding a class action prohibition unconscionable and unenforceable
due to the numerous one-sided aspects of the contract); Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that the FAA did not
preempt their decision that a class action waiver was unconscionable stating
that, “while California’s consumer protection statutes cannot prevent
enforcement under the FAA of a prohibition on collective actions as such, a
federal court properly may consider whether such a prohibition in combination
with other provisions and circumstances renders an agreement substantively
unconscionable as a matter of state law”); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a class action waiver in a
credit card consumer contract was unconscionable and unenforceable and
stating that the “manifest one-sidedness” of the clause was unconscionable
because it was intended to bar suits and relief for customers with small
claims, therefore giving the defendant a “virtual immunity” from class action
litigation); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (finding a class action waiver unconscionable because a class action
would be the most economically feasible avenue for the plaintiffs’ claim when
each claim was individually a small sum of money); Kinkel v. Cingular
Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 812, 819–21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (rejecting the
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and finding the class action waiver
unconscionable because the clause was one-sided and it effectively prevented
plaintiff from being able to bring their individual claims), aff’d, 857 N.E.2d
250 (2006); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1008 (Wash. 2007)
(finding an arbitration clause unconscionable and stating that “[a] clause that
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will become “magnets” 34 for class action litigation. Plaintiffs
looking to bring a class action lawsuit will flock to these “magnet”
jurisdictions and pursue nation-wide class litigation that includes
class members from states where the claims could not be brought
as a class. 35 Effectively, a small minority of jurisdictions could set
the law for the entire nation and hear a majority of class action
litigation. However, as this Comment will soon address, recent
Supreme Court decisions support the enforceability of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements. 36 Therefore, the concern of
magnet states and hostility towards class action waivers may
become immaterial.

B. Class Certification through Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23
Besides limiting class actions through enforcement of class
action waivers, courts can also limit class action lawsuits by
denying certification of the class. 37 If a court does not certify a
class, then the group of plaintiffs cannot proceed with class action
litigation. 38 “Under Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure], a court may choose to certify a class to resolve . . .
issues” that involve many different plaintiffs. 39 This rule grants
unilaterally and severely limits the remedies of only one side is substantively
unconscionable under Washington law”); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berer, 567
S.E.2d 265, 278–79 (W. Va. 2002) (finding a class action waiver
unconscionable because the waiver effectively gave the companies immunity
from class action suits). The Dunlap court found that a class action was
needed in this type of a case because the case was “precisely the sort of smalldollar/high volume (alleged) illegality that class action claims and remedies
are effective at addressing.” Id. at 278.
34. Glover, supra note 19, at 1754.
35. Id.; see also Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1118 (Cal.
2005) (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that if
California dishonors “class action waivers that are perfectly valid under the
governing law selected by the parties themselves, California—which now
takes a minority position on this issue—might well become the magnet for
countless nationwide consumer class action lawsuits that could not be
maintained elsewhere”).
36. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774
(2010) (holding that parties cannot be compelled to class arbitration when the
contract is silent as to whether the parties agree to class litigation as opposed
to individual litigation).
37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
38. See Bryant G. Garth, Studying Civil Litigation Through the Class
Action, 62 IND. L.J. 497, 500–01 (1987) (stating that “[i]n the federal courts or
state courts with rules analogous to Federal Rule 23, a lawsuit cannot proceed
as a class action unless it is certified under one of the three subdivisions of
23(b)”).
39. Heather M. Johnson, Resolution of Mass Product Liability Litigation
Within the Federal Rules: A Case for the Increased Use of Rule 23(b)(3) Class
Actions, 64 FORDHAM L. REV . 2329, 2333 (1996).
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courts the authority to certify a vast array of class actions, so long
as the classification fits within the Rule 23’s requirements. 40
Certification of a class of plaintiffs allows the class to pursue a
lawsuit as an “aggregate unit,” rather than each plaintiff pursuing
his or her claims in a separate lawsuit. 41
Certification mandates that the class meet all four
requirements of Rule 23(a) and fit into one of the three types of
classes under Rule 23(b). 42 The four requirements of Rule 23(a) are
numerosity,
commonality,
typicality,
and
adequacy
of
representation. 43
The first requirement, numerosity, is met when the court
determines that the class is “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” 44 Under this requirement, if the
parties are sparse enough to join together under the procedural
law of joinder, then a class action is not needed to sufficiently
litigate the claim. 45 The second requirement, commonality,
requires a showing that “there are questions of law or fact common
to the class.” 46 The requirement of commonality confirms that
class action litigation will be an efficient and useful mechanism to
ensure the common questions at issue are addressed. 47 The third
requirement, typicality, requires that the class representative’s
claims or defenses be “typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.” 48 The typicality requirement ensures that the class
representatives, whom are pursuing their own interests, are
adequately representing the interests of the other class
members. 49 The last requirement, adequacy of representation,
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
41. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV . 97, 99 (2009).
42. FED. R. CIV . P. 23; see also Cyrus Mehri & Michael D. Lieder, Onward
and Upward After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, JUSTICE (2013), http://www.justice.org/
cps/rde//justice/hs.xsl/20503.htm (stating that “[a] class action in federal court
must satisfy the four requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
and one of the three alternative conditions of Rule 23(b)”).
43. Sarah Dale, Reconsidering the Approach to 23(b)(2) Employment
Discrimination Class Actions in Light of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 38 CONN. L. REV .
967, 972 (2006).
44. FED. R. CIV . P. 23(a)(1); see also FED. R. CIV . P. 20 (addressing the
requirements for joinder of parties). This rule states that plaintiffs can join
together as long as their claim arises “out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact
common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Id.
45. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 2336 (stating that “[t]he rationale
underlying this first requirement is that if joinder is possible, the class action
device is not necessary to achieve a unified resolution of the litigation”).
46. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
47. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 2336 (stating that the second
“requirement ensures that the class action device serves to advance
convenient and uniform resolution of common issues at once”).
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
49. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 2336 (stating that the third requirement
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demands that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” 50 This last
requirement ensures that the representatives do not have a
conflict of interest with other members of the class. 51 After all
requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met, a court then determines
if the class will fit into one of the three types of classes under Rule
23 (b). 52
The first two types of classes are certified under Rule 23(b)(1)
and 23(b)(2), respectively, and are appropriate when the “claims
demand a single adjudication that binds all class members.” 53 A
Rule 23(b)(3) class is appropriate when the class action “is
superior to other methods available to adjudicate the controversy
and if common questions predominate over individual issues in the
litigation.” 54 While a court must certify Rule 23(b)(1) and (2)
classes if they meet the requirements, a court has discretion
whether or not to certify a (b)(3) class. 55 When a class is certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), all potential class members must be given
notice of the class proceeding and an option to “opt out” of the
binding result of the suit. 56 This notification process can be

“seeks to ensure that the interests of class representatives and members are
sufficiently aligned so that the court can rely on the self-interest of the class
representatives to drive them to pursue the interests of all class members”).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
51. See Johnson, supra note 40, at 2336 (stating that the adequacy of
representation requirement “is intended to ensure that the named plaintiffs do
not have any conflicts of interest with class members that would temper their
prosecution of other class members' interests”).
52. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
53. Johnson, supra note 40, at 2336.
54. Id. at 2336–37. The author describes the categories of classes that will
be certified under Rule 23 (b) as follows:
Rule 23(b)(1) mandates certification of classes if individual actions
would prejudice the defendant or absent class members. Under Rule
23(b)(2), a court must certify a class when the defendant has acted or
refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and injunctive
relief is proper. A court may certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class action if it is
superior to other methods available to adjudicate the controversy and if
common questions predominate in the litigation over individual issues.
Id.

55. See id. at 2337 (discussing how the court has discretion whether or not
to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b)(3)).
56. Id.; see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974)
(holding that all class members must be notified of the class proceeding and
the option to opt out if they “can be identified through reasonable effort”); 7AA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY K AY K ANE , & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV . § 1778 (3d ed. 2013) (stating that the
interests of the class members need to be similar otherwise a ruling would be
a “binding judgment in an action in which the absentee's interests were not
presented effectively”). Author also posits that there is a sound rationale for
requiring that questions of law or fact predominate individual questions,
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expensive, especially when numerous potential plaintiffs are
involved. 57
As previously discussed, Rule 23 allows the courts to certify
three different types of classes. However, this Comment only
addresses recent Supreme Court cases that have rejected
certification attempts under Rule 23(b)(3). 58 Therefore, the
following section will provide more information about 23(b)(3)
classes.

C. Class Certification through Rule 23(b)(3)
When a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the certification
signifies a determination by the court that “the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” 59 Unlike the commonality
requirement, in which a court determines if common questions
exist, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to look at the relationship
between the common and individual questions. 60 To help
because the members who do not opt out of the class will be bound by the
judgment. Therefore, “it is essential that their interests be connected closely.”
Id.
57. See 2 BUS. & COM . LITIG. FED. CTS. § 19:38 (3d. ed. 2012) (stating that
“[t]he notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) for 23(b)(3) class actions are
mandatory and may not be waived at the discretion of the district court”); see
also Eisen, 417 U.S. 175–79 (holding that individual notice to each 2,250,000
class members that were easily identifiable was required and could not be
waived by the district court despite the fact serving such notice would be
expensive).
58. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (finding that the class should not be
certified because the plaintiffs could not prove that the class met the
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)).
59. FED. R. CIV . P. 23; see also WRIGHT, supra note 57, at § 1778 (stating
that “[e]xactly what is meant by ‘predominate’ is not made clear in the rule . . .
[n]or have the courts developed any ready quantitative or qualitative test for
determining whether the common questions satisfy the rule’s test”).
60. See WRIGHT, supra note 57, at § 1778 (stating that “it is not sufficient
that common questions merely exist, as is true for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2)”).
The authors then address how the “court is under a duty to evaluate the
relationship between the common and individual issues in all actions under
Rule 23(b)(3). Id.; see also 59 AM . JUR. 2D PARTIES § 74 (2014) (stating that
determining if common questions predominate “involves a qualitative
assessment of common and individual questions rather than a mere
mathematical quantification of whether there are more of one than the other”).
The report goes on to state that the “[t]est for predominance of common issues
is not whether the common issues outnumber the individual ones, but whether
common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the
litigants and the court. Id.; see also Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., L.L.C., 4 A.3d 561,
575 (N.J. 2010) (stating that “to establish predominance, plaintiff does not
have to show that there is an absence of individual issues”). The Lee court
then discusses how the plaintiffs do not have to show that they have been
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determine whether this requirement is satisfied, Rule 23(b)(3)
provides the court with four factors to consider when determining
if a class should be certified. 61
Courts apply Rule 23 and the four factors to assess whether
common questions of law predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members. 62 Of course, courts routinely find that
common questions of law and fact do not predominate over
individual questions. 63 For example, in Babineau v. Federal Exp.
Corp., the Eleventh Circuit refused to certify a class of plaintiffs

injured in precisely the same way or show that they have the exact same
issues, but there must be some inquiry into the “significance of the common
questions” and find that they outweigh individual questions. Id.
61. FED. R. CIV . P. 23. The four factors listed in this rule are as follows:
(A) The class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) The extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against
class members; (C) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) The likely
difficulties in managing a class action.
Id.

62. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 472, 488 (W.D. Pa.
1999) (certifying a class stating that “the issues of conspiracy and fact of
damage are common to the class and that, while the issues of damages and
fraudulent concealment contain both common and individual questions, the
common issues predominate with respect to those issues”); Sullivan v. DB
Investments, Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 300 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that a class should
be certified because common questions predominated over individual
questions). Here, the Court looked at how the core of the claims and the
injuries suffered were the same for all of the plaintiffs. Id. The Court focused
on how each class member had a similar legal question that asked whether or
not De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy of fixing diamond prices in the
United States. Id.
63. See Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1031–32 (8th Cir.
2010) (finding that a class of purchasers in a breach of contract case could not
be certified since individual questions unique to every plaintiff would
predominate over common questions). The Court found that they would not
certify the class because they would have to look at evidence of the
surrounding circumstances when each individual plaintiff entered into the
contract. Id.; see also Babineau v. Federal Exp. Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1194
(11th Cir. 2009) (finding that a class of employees asking for payment for
when they worked during their break could not be certified because common
questions did not predominate over individual issues when the court would
have to inquire into whether or not each individual plaintiff actually worked
during their break); Saltzman v. Pella Corp., 257 F.R.D. 471, 487 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (finding that certification of a class of window purchasers is not
warranted because when calculating damages, the court would have to take an
individualized look at what each purchaser paid for each window and discount
that by how much each window had deteriorated); Genenbacher v. CenturyTel
Fiber Co. II, 244 F.R.D. 485, 489 (C.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that a class of
landowners alleging trespass should not be certified because the court would
have to do an individualized analysis for every plaintiff and determine if the
defendant had an easement on each plaintiff’s property).

2014]

Are Class Actions a Thing of the Past?

347

who were suing their employer for unpaid wages because common
questions did not predominate over individual issues. 64 The Court
reasoned that certification was improper because it would have to
inquire into whether or not each individual plaintiff actually
worked during their break to determine if each individual plaintiff
was not being paid for their work. 65 This case demonstrates how
courts are able to use Rule 23(b)(3) to limit class actions by
determining that common questions do not predominate over
individual issues. 66

D. Recent Supreme Court Decisions
Involving Class Actions
Over the past several years, the Supreme Court has decided
several significant cases addressing class action waivers,
certification, and arbitration. In Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. Animal Feeds
Int’l Corp., the Supreme Court found that parties cannot be
compelled to submit to class arbitration unless they agree to
submit to class arbitration through contract. 67 In addition, in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the
FAA preempted a California state law of unconscionability that
barred enforcement of class action waivers. 68 The Court held that
finding a class action waiver unenforceable because of the
economic unfeasibility of individual litigation was a judge-made
doctrine. Thus, it could not create an exception to the FAA, a
federal statute. 69 The Court effectively rejected the idea that an
64. Babineau, 576 F.3d at 1194.
65. Id.
66. See Jordon L. Kruse, Appealability of Class Certification Orders: The
“Mandamus Appeal” and A Proposal to Amend Rule 23, 91 NW. U. L. REV . 704,
704–05 (1997) (stating that when common questions do not predominate over
individual issues and a class is not certified, the plaintiff will have to bring an
individual suit, which many times is impractical because it “would often be
economically infeasible for the plaintiff to bring an individual action”).
67. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (stating that “a party may not be
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”).
68. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (stating that the FAA preempts
California’s state doctrine “because it stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress”) (quotations omitted).
69. Id. (rejecting the Second Circuit’s exception to the FAA that finds that
a class action waiver can be unenforceable if individual litigation would be
economically infeasible for the plaintiffs). The Court reasoned that if this rule
were to stand the “federal court [would have to] determine (and the parties
litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and
theory-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost
of developing that evidence, and the damages that would be recovered in the
event of success.” Id. The Court stated that “[s]uch a preliminary litigating
hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that
arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to
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arbitration agreement can be unenforceable if it would be
expensive for the plaintiffs to litigate individually. 70
More recently, the Supreme Court decided two cases
concerning class certification. In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court
explained that to satisfy the commonality requirement, the class
cannot merely show “that they have all suffered a violation of the
same provision of law;” instead, the class must show that the
claims “depend upon a common contention.” 71 The Court stated
that the common contention or question must be “capable of a
class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity
of each one of the claims in one stroke.” 72
After the Supreme Court decided Dukes, the Court held in
Comcast that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” in
determining if damages can be computed on a class-wide basis. 73
The plaintiffs in Comcast brought an anti-trust class action suit
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 74 They argued that
Comcast and other cable/satellite providers colluded “with
professional sports leagues to limit the availability of most
baseball, hockey, and football games to high-priced add-on
packages like NHL Center Ice or MLB Extra Innings.” 75 The Court
found that “certification was improper because respondents had
failed to establish that damages could be measured on a class-wide
basis.” 76 The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs were not able to
“bridge the differences between . . . competitive prices in general
and . . . competitive prices attributable to the [colluding].” 77
These cases have changed the way courts look at class
actions. 78 The next section will discuss how the circuit courts are
secure.” Id.
70. Id.
71. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551, The Court explained that it was not enough
that all the plaintiffs simply asserted a Title VII violation. Id. The Court gave
an example and stated that the claim would meet the commonality
requirement if the plaintiffs claimed that the same supervisor portrayed
discriminatory bias. Id.
72. Id. at 2551.
73. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. The Court used the “rigorous analysis”
standard in Wal-Mart to determine if the class met the commonality
requirements. Id. In Comcast, the Court expands that standard past the
commonality requirement and applies it to the predominance test. Id. The
Court in Comcast says that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to
determine if Rule 23 (b)(3)’s predominance test has been met. Id.
74. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432.
75. Christ Morran, Comcast Lawsuit Shows Why Mandatory Binding
Arbitration Is Just Plain Evil, (August 22, 2013), http://consumerist.com/2013/
08/22/comcast-lawsuit-shows-why-mandatory-binding-arbitration-is-justplain-evil.
76. Id. at 1431 n.4.
77. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435.
78. See Klonoff, supra note 6, at 774 (stating that the Supreme Court’s
Dukes decision appears to have given new meaning to commonality);
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applying these Supreme Court decisions.

III.HOW THE CIRCUIT COURTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO KEEP
CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS ALIVE DESPITE THE SUPREME
COURT’S ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT CLASS ACTION SUITS
Numerous legal commentaries have argued that class action
lawsuits are on the decline. 79 An analysis of recent Supreme Court
opinions shows that the Court is placing stricter limitations on
class action lawsuits. 80 This section examines the Supreme Court
decisions that address class action waivers and certification.
Additionally, it argues that the Supreme Court is attempting to
limit class actions. However, narrow application of this precedent
by the Circuit Courts has been frustrating the Supreme Court’s
efforts. 81

A. The Circuit Courts Are Narrowly Interpreting the
Supreme Court’s Decisions Involving Arbitration
Agreements and Class Action Waivers
The Supreme Court is enforcing arbitration agreements,
which limit class action suits by forcing plaintiffs to individually

Catherine R. Hecker, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: Taming “Too Big to Fail”
Classes in the Battle Against Blackmail Actions and Frivolous Litigation, 7
LIBERTY U.L. REV . 49, 63 (2012) (stating that the dissent in Wal-Mart found
that the majority’s opinion resulted in the commonality standard being a
“greater hurdle than it was ever designed to be”).
79. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out Of Liability: The Forthcoming, NearTotal Demise Of The Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV . 373, 375 (2005)
(stating that “with a handful of exceptions, class actions will soon be virtually
extinct”); Klonoff, supra note 6, at 729 (arguing that “in recent years courts
have cut back sharply on plaintiffs’ ability to bring class action lawsuits”). But
see Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy,
2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV . 319, 355 (2010–2011) (arguing that recent Supreme
Court decisions are not a threat to class action ligation by stating, “Dukes is an
important opinion, but it has not doomed the class action, nor even changed it
much.”).
80. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33 (finding that because individual
questions of damages would predominate over questions common to the class,
Rule 23 (b)(3) was not satisfied and the class should not be certified); AT&T
Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53 (holding that a California state law that
classifies most class action waivers as unconscionable is preempted by FAA);
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (finding that a common question for all plaintiffs will
not suffice to meet the commonality standard because there must be a
common answer for all of the plaintiffs).
81. See Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (re-certifying a class after the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for the court to rule in light of
Comcast); Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (reinstating the earlier decision that
certified a class action despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast, finding
that the case at hand was significantly different than Comcast).
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arbitrate instead of coming together as a class. 82 In Stolt-Nielson,
the Supreme Court drastically limited class action litigation by
declaring that silence in an arbitration agreement is, in effect, a
class arbitration waiver. 83 The dissent in Stolt-Nielsen pointed out
the radicalness of the majority’s decision and criticized it for “not
persuasively justify[ing] judicial intervention so early in the game”
and for “overturn[ing] the ruling of experienced arbitrators.” 84
Despite the Court’s ruling in Stolt-Nielsen, circuit courts did
not enthusiastically limit class actions. For example, the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the Second Circuit’s ruling in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant for
reconsideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen. 85 On remand, the Second
Circuit found that Stolt-Nielsen did not affect its earlier decision
and held that the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 86
Shortly after Stolt-Nielson, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and held that the FAA
preempted a California state law of unconscionability that barred
enforcement of class action waivers. 87 When American Express
82. See generally 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:14 (9th ed.)
(addressing how arbitration agreements limit class actions). This article also
looks at how arbitration agreements are a device companies use, or should
use, to limit class action ligation since the Supreme Court ruled in AT&T
Mobility that an “agreement requiring arbitration can also preclude a plaintiff
from initiating or participating in a class action in court or in arbitration.” Id.
at ¶ 1.
83. See MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 83 at § 2:14 (stating
that Stolt-Nielsen “held that class arbitration is impermissible unless parties
affirmatively authorize class arbitration, and that silence on the issue is
insufficient”); see also Goodale v. George S. May Intern. Co., No-10C5733, 2011
WL 1337349, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (stating that “Stolt-Nielsen protects a party
from being compelled to arbitrate class claims where the arbitration
agreement is silent with respect to such claims”); R. Bruce Allensworth,
Andrew C. Glass, Robert W. Sparkes, III, & Roger L. Smerage, Class
Arbitration Waivers: Silence Reigns In Stolt-Nielsen, But The Courts Have
More To Say, K&L G ATES (June 15, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/class-arbit
ration-waivers-silence-reigns-in-stolt-nielsen-but-the-courts-have-more-to-say06-15-2010 (quoting the Court in Stolt-Nielson stating that “[i]n a five to three
decision, the Court held that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so”) (internal quotations omitted).
84. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 688.
85. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401, 2401 (2010).
86. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 200 (2d Cir. 2011)
(finding that Stolt-Nielsen did not affect its earlier decision that the
arbitration agreement was unenforceable), adhered to on reh’g sub nom., In re
Am. Exp. Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 594 (2012), and rev’d, Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013). The Court reasoned that a class action was the “only economically
feasible means” for the plaintiffs to pursue their claims. Id. at 198. The Court
also looked at how the “damages due to any single individual or entity [was]
too small to justify bringing an individual action.” Id. at 194.
87. AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (holding that the FAA preempts
California’s state doctrine “because it stands as an obstacle to the
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reached the Second Circuit for a third time, the circuit court found
that neither Stolt-Nielsen nor Concepcion affected its prior
decision that the class action waiver was still unenforceable. 88
Because the Second Circuit was so hesitant to enforce the
class action waiver, the Supreme Court granted certiorari again
and reversing the Second Circuit’s decision. 89 The Supreme Court
adamantly held that the class action waiver was enforceable. 90
The Court declined to take a plaintiff friendly approach and forced
plaintiffs to litigate individually even if litigation was economically
infeasible. 91
This step-by-step analysis of American Express shows how the
Second Circuit was unwilling to enforce a class action waiver
despite the Supreme Court’s decisions. 92 The Supreme Court
handed down three decisions addressing class action issues before
ultimately taking the case out of the Second Circuits’ hands to
declare the class action waiver enforceable. 93 Despite the Second
Circuit’s reluctance, the Supreme Court was clear in holding that
class action waivers and arbitration agreements are enforceable. 94
In addition to limiting class actions by enforcing arbitration
agreements and class action waivers, the Supreme Court also uses
the rules of class certification as a means to limit class action
litigation. 95

accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress”) (quotations omitted).
88. Am. Exp. Merchants, 667 F.3d at 206 (stating “our original analysis [is]
unaffected by Stolt-Nielsen”). The Court went on to state, “Concepcion does not
alter our analysis, and we again reverse the district court's decision and
remand for further proceedings.” Id. The Court again found that the class
action waiver was unenforceable stating that it was “financially impossible”
for the plaintiffs to litigate individually. Id. at 219.
89. See Am. Exp. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (reversing the Court’s decision in
In re Am. Exp. Merchants’ Litig.).
90. See AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (finding a class action waiver
enforceable even if individual litigation would be economically infeasible for
the plaintiffs).
91. Id.
92. Am. Exp. Co., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (reversing the Circuit Court’s decision
and finding the class action waiver enforceable).
93. Id. at 2312 (finding a class waiver enforceable even though it may be
expensive for the plaintiffs to sue individually); see also AT&T Mobility, 131 S.
Ct. at 1752–53 (finding a class action waiver enforceable because the FAA
preempts a state law that disfavors class action waivers); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.
Ct. at 1774–75 (finding that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate class
claims where the arbitration agreement does not address the issue).
94. Am. Exp. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (finding an arbitration agreement
enforceable).
95. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (rejecting the certification of a class,
thereby denying the plaintiffs the ability to bring a class action lawsuit);
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549 (finding that a common question for all plaintiffs will
not suffice to meet the commonality standard because there must be
significant proof that there will be a common answer for all of the plaintiffs).
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B. The Supreme Court Is Using Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 to Limit Class Action Litigation
For years courts have found that classes do not meet the
requirements of Rule 23. 96 The Supreme Court has recently made
it even harder for plaintiffs to meet Rule 23’s requirements. 97 In
Dukes, the Supreme Court took a narrow approach to the
commonality requirement of Rule 23. 98 By modifying the
commonality requirement, the Court made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to be certified as a class. 99 The Court increased the
certification standard by finding that the class’ problem must be
“capable of a class-wide resolution.” 100 Therefore, to meet the
commonality requirement, Dukes made it mandatory for class
members to show that there is a common answer to their common
contention. 101 In essence, the Supreme Court communicated to the
lower courts that a common question is no longer sufficient to meet
Rule 23’s commonality requirement.
Before the Court’s decision in Dukes, the commonality
requirement was easy to satisfy and rarely an obstacle for class

96. See Williams v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 379 F. App’x 548, 549 (9th
Cir. 2010) (finding that a class should not be certified under Rule 23 (b)(3)
because “individual issues predominated”); Weigele v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys., Inc., 267 F.R.D. 614, 625 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (denying certification of a class
by finding that Rule 23(b)(3) was not met because a class action was not a
superior method for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims); Rattray v. Woodbury
Cnty., IA, 614 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that the class could not be
certified under Rule 23 because the plaintiffs could not prove the adequacy of
the representation requirement); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d
402, 425 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that a class should not be certified because it
did not meet the requirements of 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3), stating “issues common
to the proposed class do not predominate over those affecting only individual
plaintiffs and . . . a class action would not be a fair and efficient method for
adjudicating these claims”).
97. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2549 (finding that there must be a showing of a
common answer for all of the plaintiffs because a common question for all
plaintiffs will not suffice to meet the commonality standard).
98. Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60
UCLA L. REV . 1652, 1675 (2013).
99. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. The Court explained that no longer can a
class merely show “that they have all suffered a violation of the same
provision of law,” but instead the class must show that the claims “depend
upon a common contention” to be certified. Id.
100. Id. at 2551.
101. See Klonoff, supra note 6, at 775 (stating that “under the Dukes
formulation, it is not enough that the question is common; rather, the question
must be essential to the outcome of the case”); Mark Perry & Joe Sellers, Class
Actions in the Wake of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 367, 368
(2011) (stating that in order to meet the commonality requirement, the Dukes
Court found that “you have to have a common question, and the common
question must have a common answer, one that can be adjudicated on behalf
of the class as a whole”).
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certification. 102
Dukes
narrowed the application of the
commonality standard and changed the way courts examine the
requirement. 103 Courts now regularly cite Dukes in finding that a
class should not be certified. 104

C. Comcast v. Behrend: Further Supreme Court
Limitation on Plaintiffs’ Access to Class Actions
After Dukes, the Supreme Court continued to constrain class
actions by requiring courts to conduct a “rigorous analysis” in
determining if damages can be computed on a class-wide basis. 105
The Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast is an instruction to the
“federal courts to scrutinize class actions more zealously before
certification, including weighing damage theories carefully.” 106
After Comcast, the Court vacated and remanded three other cases
instructing the lower courts to rule in light of its decision. 107 In
102. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir.
2009) (stating that Rule 23’s commonality requirement is a “low hurdle”); In re
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.
2008) (stating that the commonality requirement is a “low bar, and courts
have generally given it a permissive application”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir.
1999) (purporting that meeting the commonality requirement is “not
demanding”); Baby Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that the commonality requirement is “easily met”); Klonoff, supra note
6, at 773 (stating “prior to the Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in Dukes,
commonality, like numerosity, was rarely an impediment to class
certification”).
103. See Klonoff, supra note 6, at 774 (stating that [t]he Supreme Court's
Dukes decision appears to have given new meaning to commonality);
Catherine R. Hecker, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: Taming “Too Big to Fail”
Classes in the Battle Against Blackmail Actions and Frivolous Litigation, 7
LIBERTY U. L. REV . 49, 63 (2012) (stating that the dissent in Dukes found that
the majority’s opinion resulted in the commonality standard being a “greater
hurdle than it was ever designed to be”).
104. See Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 07-2050, 2011 WL 2682967,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court's recent
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes . . . has since heightened the Court's
concerns . . . and recent developments in the law of class actions, [warrant]
decertification of the class”); see also Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d
372, 386 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying Dukes v. Dukes and finding that the class of
plaintiffs should not be certified because they did not meet the burden of
demonstrating that the commonality requirement was met).
105. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433
106. John Campbell, Special Section: Consumer Protection Law: Article:
Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, And Wholesale Change To
Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV . 463, 465 (2013).
107. See Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768 (vacating the judgment and remanding
the case “to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for
further consideration in light of Comcast”); see also Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct.
at 1722 (vacating the lower court’s ruling and remanding the case “to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration
in light of Comcast”); see also RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross, 133 S. Ct. 1722, 1722
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doing so, the Court was sending a message to the lower courts to
set a higher standard for meeting Rule 23’s requirements. 108

D. Supreme Court Intent: Actual Limitation or Simply
a Narrow Limitation?
Even though the Supreme Court decertified the classes in
Dukes and Comcast, some commentaries suggest that that the
“Court did not put an end to the class action[,] . . . [i]nstead, it
recognized that certain tactics . . . did not comport with the
requirements of due process.” 109 In an article, Andrew Trask states
that “Dukes is hardly a revolutionary decision” and he argues that
“Dukes is an important opinion, but it has not doomed the class
action, nor even changed it much.” 110
Dukes and Comcast both produced 5–4 split decisions,
signaling that the issues were widely disputed. The dissent in
Comcast, written by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, states, “The Court’s ruling is good
for this day and this case only.” 111 Some did not find this case to be
groundbreaking and questioned “why the Court granted certiorari
in the first place or issued any decision ultimately.” 112 Despite
these arguments as to the weight of the decisions, the repeated
stream of recent cases show that the Supreme Court majority is
effectively limiting class action litigation by producing opinions
that decertify classes or enforce class action waivers. 113 While
these cases standing alone may not prove the Court’s intention to
limit class actions, viewing the cases as an aggregate unit shows
(2013) (vacating and remanding the case “to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Comcast”).
108. See Schwartz, supra note 99, at 1694 (stating that “[t]he restrictive
view of commonality in Wal-Mart and the rigorous assessment of merits and
damages models encouraged by Wal-Mart and Comcast will undoubtedly lead
to fewer classes certified”); see also Klonoff, supra note 6, at 756 (stating that
the fact that the Supreme Court decided Comcast “might signal to lower courts
that the safest approach in most cases is to reject class certification”).
109. Trask, supra note 80, at 355.
110. Id.
111. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437.
112. Bryan J. Schwartz & Michael D. Thomas, Comcast v. Behrend:
Supreme Court Conservative Majority Reaches to Strike Down Class Action,
with Holdings of Limited Weight, BRYAN SCHWARTZ LAW (March 27, 2013),
http://bryanschwartzlaw.blogspot.com/2013/03/this-morning-supreme-courtissued-its.html/.
113. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (holding that a class cannot be
certified because damages could be me measured on a class-wide basis);
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552 (finding that a class of plaintiffs cannot be certified);
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (finding that the FAA preempts California’s
state doctrine of unconscionability that barred enforcement of class action
waivers); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (finding that the defendant could
not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration).
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that the Court is restricting plaintiffs’ access to class actions. 114

E. The Circuit Courts Narrow Applications
of Comcast v. Behrend
The circuit courts, in applying Comcast, continue to certify
class actions despite the Supreme Court’s ruling. 115 In Butler v.
Sears, a class of plaintiffs sued a manufacturer for selling faulty
washing machines. 116 Judge Posner stated in the Seventh Circuit
opinion: “Sears argues that most members of the plaintiff class did
not experience a mold problem. But if so, that is an argument not
for refusing to certify the class but for certifying it and then
entering a judgment that will largely exonerate Sears.” 117 After
Comcast was decided, the Supreme Court remanded Butler for
reconsideration in light of Comcast. 118 On remand the defendants
cited Comcast and argued that the plaintiffs did not suffer the
same damages because “most members of the plaintiff class had
not experienced any mold problem.” 119 The defendants urged the
Court to find that individual issues, including damage
calculations, would predominate over common issues. 120 However,
the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and restored the class
of plaintiffs after finding that Comcast did not affect its earlier
decision to certify the class action. 121
The Seventh Circuit stated that “[i]t would drive a stake
through the heart of the class action device . . . to require that
every member of the class have identical damages.” 122 Therefore,
the Court recognized that “[i]f the issues of liability are genuinely
common issues, and damages of individual class members can be
readily determined in individual hearings, in settlement
negotiations, or by creation of subclasses, the fact that damages
114. Klonoff, supra note 6, at 730 (stating that “the overall impact of [the
Supreme Court] case law trends has been to curtail substantially the ability of
plaintiffs to obtain class treatment”); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Comcast Follows
Wal-Mart in High Court Lawsuit Attack, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 5,
2012,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-11-05/comcast-follows-walmart-in-high-court-lawsuit-attack (stating that “[t]he Wal-Mart decision is
making it more and more difficult to certify class actions”) (internal quotations
omitted).
115. See Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (restoring a class of plaintiffs despite the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast); Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861
(restoring a class action after the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast).
116. Butler, 727 F.3d at 798.
117. Butler, 702 F.3d at 362.
118. Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768.
119. Butler, 727 F.3d at 799.
120. Id.; see also Dye, supra note 7 (stating that the defendant argued that
“not all customers suffered the same alleged problems, and that, like in
Comcast, there were too many individual issues to justify class certification”).
121. Id. at 800–01.
122. Id.
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are not identical across all class members should not preclude
class certification.” 123 In deciding Butler, the Court could have
broadly applied Comcast and easily held that the class was not
certifiable because damages could not be measured on a class-wide
basis. 124 Instead, the Seventh Circuit found Comcast fact-specific
and applied it narrowly. 125
The Seventh Circuit asserted that its Butler decision was
consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in In re Whirlpool
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation. 126 In
Whirlpool, the Sixth Circuit certified a class of plaintiffs alleging
that they purchased defective washing machines. 127 The court
distinguished Comcast because the issues of liability and damages
were “bifurcated” in Whirlpool. 128 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
“[w]here determinations on liability and damages have been
bifurcated, . . . the decision in Comcast—to reject certification of a
. . . class because plaintiffs failed to establish that damages could
be measured on a class-wide basis—has limited application.” 129
The Sixth Circuit only certified the class for litigation of liability
issues and noted that Comcast would be applied when the issues of
damages is addressed. 130 The Court’s refusal to use Comcast to
decertify the class at this stage 131 reflected a narrow application of
Comcast that mirrored the Seventh Circuit’s approach. 132

123. Id.
124. See John H. Beisner, Jessica D. Miller, & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, BNA
Insights: From Cable TV to Washing Machines: The Supreme Court Cracks
Down on Class Actions, (May 8, 2013), http://www.bna.com/from-cable-tv-towashing-machines-the-supreme-court-cracks-down-on-class-actions
(stating
that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast could “prompt additional scrutiny
of the lack of injury for the majority of class members, since any damages
evidence would have to take account of differences within the class”). This
article was published before the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Butler, and the
author states that if the lower courts “read between the lines” of Comcast,
then the Comcast ruling could “portend the end of Butler.” Id.
125. See Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (applying Comcast narrowly and finding
that the Supreme Court’s decision did not affect the earlier decision to certify
a class action).
126. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 844.
127. Id. at 860–61.
128. Id. The court states that the class was “certified for liability purposes
only, leaving individual damages calculations to subsequent proceedings.” Id.
at 861 (quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 860.
130. Id. at 861.
131. Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861.
132. Id.

2014]

Are Class Actions a Thing of the Past?

357

F. The Circuit Courts Refusal to Limit Class Actions
Counteracts the Supreme Court’s Efforts to Limit
Class Action Litigation
The recent cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court is
taking a closer look at class actions. The Court allows certification
only after there has been a “rigorous analysis” confirming that the
requirements of Rule 23 have been met. 133 However, when the
Supreme Court ordered the circuit courts to rule in light of
Comcast, they applied Comcast narrowly and found that Comcast
did not affect their decisions to certify a class of plaintiffs. 134 The
circuit courts are limiting Comcast’s application, just as the
Second
Circuit
attempted
to
limit
American
Express’
application. 135 The circuit courts are not finding Comcast novel
enough to change their earlier decisions. 136 Therefore, as the
Seventh Circuit puts it, the question remains: “why did the
Supreme Court remand the case for reconsideration in light of
[Comcast]?” 137

IV. PROPOSAL: A BROADER APPLICATION
OF C OMCAST V. B EHREND
Recent cases show that the Supreme Court is trying to limit
class actions, but the circuit courts are applying Comcast narrowly
in an attempt to restore and preserve class action litigation. 138
While there are advantages to class action lawsuits, 139 class action
133. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (stating that “courts must conduct a
rigorous analysis” when determining if all the requirements of Rule 23 have
been met) (quotations omitted); Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (stating that a class
cannot be certified until it has been determined, “after a rigorous analysis,
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied”) (quotations omitted).
134. Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (applying Comcast but still restoring a class of
plaintiffs); Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (restoring a class action after
applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast).
135. See Am. Exp. Merchants, 667 F.3d at 206 (stating that “our original
analysis [is] unaffected by Stolt–Nielsen” or AT&T Mobility); Butler, 727 F.3d
at 801 (holding that Comcast has limited application); Whirlpool Corp., 722
F.3d at 861 (finding that Comcast has limited application).
136. Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (stating that Comcast does not change the
Court’s earlier ruling); Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (finding Comcast does
not affect the Court’s earlier decision to certify a class).
137. Butler, 727 F.3d at 800.
138. See Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (applying the Supreme Court’s
decision in Comcast, but still restoring a class action suit); Butler, 727 F.3d at
800 (holding that Comcast does not prevent the Court from certifying a class of
plaintiffs).
139. See generally Katie Melnick, In Defense of the Class Action Lawsuit:
An Examination of the Implicit Advantages and A Response to Common
Criticisms, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 755, 788 (2008) (discussing the
benefits of class action lawsuits and arguing that class actions should be
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suits have many disadvantages as well. 140 This section will
propose that the Supreme Court should clarify the classification
standards set forth in Comcast. Additionally, the Court should
expressly state that class actions must be used in only a small
number of circumstances. Finally, the Attorney General should
regulate businesses and corporations in lieu of private attorneys
attempting to use class action ligation as a means of regulating
businesses.

A. The Supreme Court Must Clarify Comcast
On October 7, 2013, the defendants in Butler petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari for review. 141 The case has generated
substantial interests as several amici have filed briefs. 142 These
briefs address and support the contention that efficiency concerns
cannot override a courts determination of whether Rule 23(b)(3) is
satisfied. 143 They also discuss the importance of conducting a
rigorous analysis as to whether common liability and damages
issues dominate. 144 Several of these briefs argue that the circuit
courts incorrectly applied Comcast and ignored the requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3). 145
upheld despite common criticisms).
140. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 18:22 (4th ed.) (listing the
disadvantages of class action lawsuits from both a defendant and plaintiff
perspective).
141 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler (II), U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ,
http://www.chamberlitigation.com/sears-roebuck-and-co-v-butler-ii
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2014).
142. See Sears, Roebuck and Company Docket, SUPREME COURT OF THE
U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/13-430
.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014) (listing off the numerous briefs amici curiae
filed for Butler v. Sears).
143. See Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Butler, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus
blog.com/case-files/cases/sears-roebuck-and-company-v-butler/
(last
visited
Nov. 19, 2014) (framing the issues presented to the Supreme Court in Sears v.
Butler). The brief frames the issues presented to the Court as follows:
1. Whether the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied by
the purported ‘efficiency’ of a class trial on one abstract issue, without
considering the host of individual issues that would need to be tried to
resolve liability and damages and without determining whether the
aggregate of common issues predominates over the aggregate of
individual issues.
2. Whether a product liability class may be certified where it is
undisputed that most members did not experience the alleged defect or
harm.
Id.

144. Id.
145. See Brief of Amicus Curiae DRI in Support of Petitioners at 4–5,
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-430)
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The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and found
that the Seventh Circuit erred in certifying the class action. Judge
Posner’s opinion, finding that the class should be certified, directly
defies the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast, which stated that
a class cannot be certified if it cannot establish that “damages
could be measured on a class-wide basis.” 146 Granting certiorari in
Butler would have provided the Supreme Court with a case in
which to demonstrate the broad application of Comcast. 147 Because
Comcast is “a case that no one can quite figure out what it stands
for,” 148 the Supreme Court must hand down another decision to
clarify its meaning and give the decision weight.

B. The Supreme Court Should Be Limiting
Class Actions
The Supreme Court should affirmatively state that Comcast
must be applied broadly so that class actions may only be utilized
in a limited number of circumstances. Despite the advantages of
class action litigation, 149 the true benefits of class action litigation
are not passed on to society as a whole. 150 In general, the attorney
(stating that “[d]espite [the Supreme Court’s] order to reconsider their prior
opinions in light of Comcast, . . . the Glazer and Butler courts failed to
rigorously analyze the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)”). The brief
also goes on to argue that had the Butler court “properly exercised their duty
under Rule 23(b)(3), they would have necessarily concluded that common
questions did not predominate.” Id.
146. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4.
147. Colin E. Flora, 7th Circuit Again Certifies Butler v. Sears, Roebuck, &
Co. Class, HOOSIER LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013) http://www.pavlacklawfirm.
com/blog/2013/08/23/7th-circuit-again-certifies-butler-133084 (stating that “if
Comcast truly did stand for the requirement of class-wide damages evidence,
then it will take another Supreme Court decision to once more elevate
Comcast to that position”).
148. Id.
149. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 141 (listing off the
advantages to class action litigation). Here some of these advantages from a
plaintiff’s perspective:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Id.

The opportunity to share expenses with other class members;
Increased deterrent value;
More powerful litigational posture;
The availability of broader discovery rights;
In patent class actions, avoidance of the need for multiple suits by
a patent holder;
The tolling of the statute of limitations;
Increased potential attorney's fees;
The nonfeasibility of other means of litigation;
Public awareness and organizing potential.

150. See Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of
the Class Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV . 719, 720 (2006) (stating that the
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representing the class is the one soliciting the client, not the other
way around. 151 The class action relationship turns into one “in
which the attorney becomes the principal and the unsophisticated
client becomes the agent, with minimal ability to monitor the
behavior of the class action counsel.” 152 Plaintiff’s lawyers solicit
these class action plaintiffs because the lawyers class actions often
lead to large settlements or judgments and, therefore, large
attorney’s fees. 153 The lawyers are usually the only ones really
benefiting from such lawsuits because the lawyers receive high
contingency fees while the individual plaintiffs dividing the
judgment receive little or no monetary gain. 154
Another disadvantage of class action lawsuits is that they are
often used as a form of “legalized blackmail.” 155 The cost of
litigating a class action lawsuit is so high that companies are
pressured into settlement, even if the claim is frivolous. 156
Therefore, plaintiffs, or better yet, the plaintiff’s attorneys, benefit
critics of class action litigation believe that “class action litigation enriches
lawyers without providing any real benefit to society”).
151. See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders
or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI . LEGAL F. 403, 405–06 (2003) (noting that
the “customary principal-agent relationship between attorney . . . and the
client . . . fails to exist in the typical class action”).
152. Id. at 406.
153. See Melnick, supra note 140, at 763 (stating that the critics of class
action lawsuits allege that lawyers who take these cases begin to argue “for
nothing more than their own monetary gain” and forget that they are
representing a class of injured plaintiffs). The author also lays out a typical
scenario of how an attorney soliciting a client in the class action context plays
out: An “attorney gets word that a drug has been taken off the market or that
complications have been reported in those who have ingested the drug. He
subsequently begins to advertise, encouraging people to contact him if they
have (or anyone in their family has) ever taken the medicine.” Id. at 759–60.
154. See Fact Sheet: Securing Our Economic Future (Dec. 15, 2004)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=81509 (discussing how in the class
action context, “injured parties often receive awards of little or no value while
lawyers receive large fees”); see also RICHARD A. MICHAEL, 4 ILL. PRAC., CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 30:1 (2nd ed.) at n.2 (2012) (illustrating this
problem as follows: “If for a class of 50,000 people, each class member recovers
$10 of which $3 goes to pay attorney’s fees, each class member obtains $7
while the attorney receives fees of $150,000.”).
155. F. Ehren Hartz, Certify Now, Worry Later: Arkansas’s Flawed
Approach to Class Certification, 61 ARK. L. REV . 707, 717 (2009).
156. See Steven B. Hantler, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Is the
“Crisis” in the Civil Justice System Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L. REV . 1121,
1136–37 (2005) (arguing that class actions are analogous to poker because
“potential costs of losing often force companies to fold their hands and settle
rather than call the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s bluff”); see also Callan Edquist, The
Status of Environmental Class Action Post Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 43 TEX. ENVTL.
L.J. 51, 52 (2012) (discussing how class action lawsuits threaten extremely
high litigation costs). This article exemplifies the high cost of class action
litigation and uses the Dukes case as an example. The article states that in
Dukes, “with a class of 1.5 million women, Wal-Mart faced a minimum of a
multi-billion dollar award if the class was certified.” Id.
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from the simple threat of frivolous claims. 157 For example, in
Butler, the court’s certification decision may have pressured the
defendants to settle even though a majority of the plaintiffs did
not experience a mold problem. If class actions are restricted,
corporations and businesses will be able and encouraged to use the
money they once reserved for settling these class actions suits to
stimulate the economy. 158

C. The Other Side of the Coin: The Benefits of Class
Action to Society
Several commentaries claim that class action litigation has
several advantages that make it worthwhile. 159 They argue that
class actions should not be limited because such litigation provides
relief for plaintiffs when individualized litigation would be too
inefficient and expensive. 160 This contention suggests that when
the value of the plaintiff's claim is “so low as to remove any
financial incentive to either litigate or arbitrate alone, but where
the collective corporate deterrent value of many similarly-situated
plaintiffs would be quite high, class actions remain the most
efficient weapon that consumers have in their litigation
arsenal.” 161 Class action advocates also assert that class litigation
helps regulate and redress corporate wrongdoing. 162 As the
prevalence of class action waivers grows, 163 however, class actions
157. See Sheila Birnbaum, Class Certification—The Exception, Not the
Rule, 41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV . 347, 350 (1997) (arguing that class action
ligation is a form of legalized blackmail and rejecting the contention that
defendants only settle meritless claims).
158. See Jessie Kokrda Kamens, ‘Dramatic Halo Effect’ of Wal-Mart Ruling
Seen Spurring Change in Workplace Suits, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 18, 2013)
(stating that “[t]he top 10 settlements [in employment discrimination
litigation] in 2012 totaled $48.65 million, a sharp decline from 2010, the year
prior to Dukes, when the total was $346.4 million”).
.159 See generally Melnick, supra note 140, at 755 (defending class actions
despite the common criticisms associated with class action litigation).
160. See id. at 756 (stating that class action lawsuits give plaintiffs the
“ability to raise actionable claims despite the fact that damages suffered by
the individuals themselves were relatively small and outweighed by the hefty
expense and burden of individual litigation”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
161. Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion:
Why the Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effective Relief
to Small-Value Claimants, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV . 1345, 1381 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
162. See Ilana T. Buschkin, The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in A
Globalized Economy—Permitting Foreign Claimants to Be Members of Class
Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts, 90 CORNELL L. REV . 1563, 1565
(2005) (stating that when corporate wrongdoing results in small financial
losses, the class action is “only cost-effective method of litigating claims”).
163. Gibbs, supra note 162, at 1346 (stating that a “high percentage of the
contracts that consumers enter into on a day-to-day basis appear to contain
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may fail to perform either deter or redress. 164
Fortunately, there are other means to address corporate
wrongdoing. Each state attorney general could use his or her
parens patriae power to remedy the type of corporate wrongdoing
that class actions are supposedly attempting to redress. 165
Currently, class action plaintiff’s lawyers act as private attorneys
general by pursuing corporations for engaging in illegal conduct. 166
The state, acting as parens patriae, can also sue to redress injury
to sovereign and “quasi-sovereign” interests. 167 The states’
attorneys general should step into this role and represent the
common interests of the citizens of their states in situations where
corporate actions need to be redressed or corporations need to be
deterred from wrongful conduct. 168 A recent Supreme Court
decision found that parens patriae lawsuits filed by a state
attorney general are not subject the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005. 169 Commentators suggest to that this decision “will
incentivize state [a]ttorney[s] [g]eneral[] to bring more of these
types of lawsuits in the future.” 170 States’ attorneys general should
take advantage of this leeway and step in to protect the consumers
that do not have an incentive or means to individually litigate,
thereby decreasing the need for class action litigation. 171
mandatory arbitration clauses . . . and [a] sizable portion of those arbitration
clauses contain class-action waiver provisions that prevent consumers from
joining together to pursue their claims as a class”); see also Am. Exp. Co., 133
S. Ct. at 2312 (finding a class waiver enforceable despite the fact that it may
be expensive for the plaintiffs to litigate individually); AT&T Mobility, 131 S.
Ct. at 1752–53 (declaring that the FAA preempts a state law that disfavors
class action waivers); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774–75 (finding that a party
cannot be compelled to class arbitration if the arbitration agreement does not
expressly permit class arbitration).
164. Id.
165. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 30, at 630 (discussing how the
attorney general could use its parens patriae role to address corporate
wrongdoing).
166. Id. at 630.
167. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the
Attorney General As the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 100 (2005). The author explains that the “state’s
sovereign interest is its interest in seeing that its laws are obeyed and
enforced, and that the health and well-being, both physical and economic, of
its residents is protected.” Id. at 101.
168. See id. (stating that the attorney general should step in to “represent
the interests of their citizens in the very consumer, antitrust, wage-and-hour,
and other cases that have long provided the staple of class action practice”).
169. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 746
(2014).
170. John H. Beisner, Paul M. Eckles, James A. Keyte, & Karen Hoffman
Lent, Supreme Court Decides Parens Patriae Suits Must Remain in State
Court, SKADDEN (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.skadden.com/insights/supremecourt-decides-parens-patriae-suits-must-remain-state-court.
171. See James R. Copland, On the Supreme Court cert docket: Glazer and
Butler, POINTOFLAW (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2014/
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions are affirmatively pro
class action waivers. It seems as though the Supreme Court is
attempting to limit class actions by making it harder for classes to
become certified. Because of the enactment of the FAA, the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the widespread use of class
action waivers, class actions are on the decline. However, the
circuit courts still are certifying classes by narrowly interpreting
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Comcast. Hence, class action
litigation remains alive and well.
Class actions hinder society by taking money out of the hands
of businesses and putting it in the pockets of lawyers. They
represent a form of legalized blackmail that forces companies to
settle for large sums. Although class actions still thrive in today’s
court system, 172 a decrease in the number of class actions would
benefit the entire legal system and, most important, society as a
whole. To achieve these benefits, the Supreme Court should hand
down another class action decision giving the circuit courts no
choice but to take a more restrictive approach when determining if
a class should be certified.

01/on-the-supreme-court-cert-docket-glazer-and-butler.php (discussing how a
petition for certiorari has been filed for Butler and stating the Supreme Court
should take the case to “clarify the reach of Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Comcast v.
Behrend”).
172. See Trask, supra note, 80 at 319 (stating that “[n]otwithstanding the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which curbed some of the worst
abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers in securities cases, securities class actions are
still thriving”).

